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ABSTRACT 
 Current law concerning the militarization and 
weaponization of outer space is inadequate for present times.  The 
increased implementation of “dual-use” space technologies poses 
obstacles for the demilitarization of space.  This paper examines 
how far the militarization of space should be taken and also 
whether weapons of any kind should be placed in space.  Further 
steps must be taken in international space law to attempt to keep 
the militarization and weaponization of space under control in 
order to promote and maintain a free outer space for research and 
exploration.   
INTRODUCTION 
 Outer space is the setting for many science fiction novels and 
movies, but what was once viewed as only fantasy may now be closer to 
reality than many realize.  Space wars are no longer just a plot device, but 
rather a genuine issue that international law must acknowledge and 
address in the near future.1   
 The current international legal regime regarding outer space 
established by the United Nations (UN) under the Outer Space Treaty2 is 
inadequate to handle many of the weaponization issues in space that are 
likely to arise in the near future and are even now beginning to occur.  The 
Outer Space Treaty must either be amended or a new treaty must be 
formed in order to address the recent increase in the militarization of space 
and the threat of the weaponization of space.  A change in space law needs 
to occur to keep space from becoming a hazardous battleground.  But, 
whether such a change is feasible in today’s security climate is still 
unclear.   
                                                     
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2018; Colgate University, B.A. 
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1 See José Monserrat Filho, Total Militarization of Space and Space Law: The 
Future of the Article IV of the 67’ Outer Space Treaty, 40 PROC. ON L. OUTER 
SPACE 358, 361–62 (1997). 
2 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 6, Jan. 
27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.  
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I. THE CURRENT ISSUES IN SPACE 
 The control of space became a national security concern for the 
United States in 1957 when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik into orbit.3  
The United States responded by passing the National Aeronautics and 
Space Act creating the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) and propelling the world into the space race.4  The space race did 
not end when the United States successfully placed a man on the moon, 
but has instead accelerated from that point with advances in technology.  
Military support in space dramatically increased between the Vietnam War 
and the 1991 Persian Gulf War, which caused many to call the Persian 
Gulf War the first “space war.”5   
 The number of satellites in space has grown significantly since the 
1991 Gulf War.  Today, there are over 1,300 active satellites in space and 
over 2,500 inactive ones.6  The United States owns the most with over half 
of the active satellites, and Russia and China follow with about 130 each.7  
Not all of these satellites are exclusively “military satellites,” but the 
growing trend is to have dual-purpose satellites by utilizing “civilian 
satellites” for military purposes or vice versa.  For example, “[a] satellite 
that in peacetime uses the global positioning system (GPS) constellation 
of spacecraft for navigation purposes, may in wartime utilize that same 
capability to target bombs or remotely piloted vehicles.”8 This 
civilian/military overlap adds to the difficulty in developing a functioning 
legal framework for the militarization of space.   
 Several recent events have placed the issues surrounding the 
weaponization of space at the forefront of global headlines.  First, the 
Chinese tested anti-satellite missile technology (ASAT) in 2007.9  This 
launch sent two clear messages to the world:  the Chinese were developing 
                                                     
3 Adam G. Quinn, The New Age of Space Law: The Outer Space Treaty and the 
Weaponization of Space, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 475, 478 (2008). 
4 Id. 
5 MARCIA S. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB92011, U.S. SPACE PROGRAMS: 
CIVILIAN, MILITARY, AND COMMERCIAL 8 (2006). 
6 Malcolm Ritter, How Many Man-Made Satellites Are Currently Orbiting 
Earth?, TALKING POINTS MEMO (March 28, 2014, 9:37 AM), http://talking 
pointsmemo.com/idealab/satellites-earth-orbit.  
7 Id.   
8 María de las Mercedes Esquivel de Cocca, Militarization of Space, 45 PROC. ON 
L. OUTER SPACE 216, 219 (2002). 
9 See Quinn, supra note 3, at 476.  Russia has also tested earth-based ASAT 
weaponry and has caused damage to orbiting satellites.  See Esquivel de Cocca, 
supra note 8, at 219.  
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weapons that had the potential to destroy objects in orbit,10 and space 
debris could soon be a major problem.11  Second, the United States has 
also successfully shot down its own malfunctioning satellite.12  The U.S. 
Missile Defense Agency is working on a $400 million project to put 
sensors on current satellites in orbit that can detect the military capabilities 
of other satellites and spacecraft.13  Finally, North Korea has been making 
advancements toward getting up to space, which underscores the fear of 
instability in space. 14 
 While there are currently no weapons in space,15 the events 
described above show that the weaponization of space is not as far away 
as some might think.16  Thus, it is important to create a legal regime that 
can handle modern technology trends and place sufficient limits on 
                                                     
10 Quinn, supra note 3, at 476. 
11 See Anél Ferreira-Snyman, Selected Legal Challenges Relating to the Military 
Use of Outer Space, with Specific Reference to Article IV of the Outer Space 
Treaty, 18 POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L.J. 488, 490 (2015).  
12 Esquivel de Cocca, supra note 8, at 219–20 (identifying other anti-satellite 
efforts that the United States are known to be currently working on, including the 
Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) lasers (which Russia also has 
the capability to employ), mid-course missile interceptors used to target satellites, 
and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) capable of reaching lower-
Earth orbit (LEO)).   
13 Marcus Weisgerber, Pentagon Eyes Missile-Defense Sensors in Space, 
DEFENSE ONE (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/08/ 
pentagon-wants-put-missile-defense-radarspace/131162/?oref=defenseone_ 
today_nl. 
14 Blair Stephenson Kuplic, The Weaponization of Outer Space: Preventing an 
Extraterrestrial Arms Race, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1123, 1125 (2014) 
(finding that, while North Korea reportedly developed the engine “to place a 
satellite into outer space,” its intentions may not be so benign, and this further 
underscores the need to halt the space arms race). 
15 See Filho, supra note 1, at 366 (“Outer space not only continues free of any 
kind of weapon but has never been the stage for a single hostile act.”); Quinn, 
supra note 3, at 494 (“While no state wants to be the first to openly weaponize 
space, many are investing in dual-use technology.”). 
16 See, e.g., Alexander Chanock, The Problems and Potential Solutions Related to 
the Emergence of Space Weapons in the 21st Century, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 691, 
694 (2013) (“[T]he United States has taken a number of policy steps that illustrate 
it no longer views space as existing solely for peaceful means.”); see also Kuplic, 
supra note 14, at 1137–40 (identifying other technologies currently being 
developed, such as  kinetic energy ASAT capabilities; co-orbital ASAT 
capabilities, which “use a missile armed with explosives” to detonate when in 
close proximity to a target; directed energy capabilities, such as dazzlers, lasers, 
or high-powered microwave frequencies; “soft-kill” weapons, which disable 
rather than destroy; electromagnetic weaponry; and space bombers).   
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military space activity before nations cross a line in space from which the 
world cannot come back.  While the UN has continually failed to reach a 
solution in recent years, primarily because the United States refuses to 
come to the negotiation table,17 the events and technologies mentioned 
above and growing international tension should push nations to find a 
solution that can be agreed upon by all the spacefaring nations. 
II. THE CURRENT LAW IN SPACE 
 When Russia launched Sputnik, the world watched with fear and 
concern for the future.  The United States followed suit, and soon space 
was more within reach than it had ever been before.  Thus, the world had 
to quickly create a legal framework to govern space exploration and space 
warfare.  “Where humans go, law follows.”18   
A. International Law 
 The UN created the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful 
Use of Outer Space (COPUOS)19 to better address the growing issues in 
space, and it has grown into “one of the largest United Nations 
committees.”20  COPUOS has drawn on the experiences from the 
regulation of other international commons, such as international waters 
and terrestrial treaties.21 
                                                     
17 See DONALD H. RUMSFELD ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS 
UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION 
80 (2001) [hereinafter RUMSFELD SPACE COMMISSION]; see also Chanock, supra 
note 16, at 694 (“Consistent with its development of weapons for space, the 
United States has taken a number of policy steps that illustrate it no longer views 
space as existing solely for peaceful means. This is exemplified by the United 
States withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2001.”); 
Kuplic, supra note 14, at 1157, 1160 (“The United States, however, has 
consistently resisted measures taken to prevent an arms race in outer space, 
abstaining from or even voting against numerous PAROS resolutions passed by 
the United Nations General Assembly.  Additionally, the United States has 
resisted proposals to give the United Nations Conference on Disarmament a 
mandate to open formal negotiations on space weapons.  When explaining its 
resistance to talks about preventing an arms race in outer space, the United States 
denies that there is either current or an imminent arms race in outer space.”). 
18 Jesse Londin, Who Owns Mars? The Law in Outer Space, ROCKET LAW. (Aug. 
20, 2012), https://www.rocketlawyer.com/blog/who-owns-mars-the-law-in-outer 
-space-98425.   
19 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: 2017, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER 
SPACE AFF., http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/copuos/index.html (last visited Mar. 
5, 2017).  
20 Quinn, supra note 3, at 478.   
21 Id. at 483. 
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1. The Outer Space Treaty 
 The Outer Space Treaty is the only space treaty with any 
remaining bite today and forms the basic legal framework of international 
space law.22  The Treaty establishes that “[t]he exploration and use of outer 
space . . . shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all 
countries . . . and shall be the province of all mankind.”23  Article IV of the 
Treaty is the most relevant to the militarization of space and provides: 
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the 
earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of 
weapons of mass destruction, instal [sic] such weapons on celestial 
bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.  
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties 
to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.  The establishment 
of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any 
type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial 
bodies shall be forbidden.  The use of military personnel for scientific 
research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited.  
The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful 
exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be 
prohibited.24  
Notably, the Treaty does not mention or give guidance on placing non-
weapons of mass destruction in space,25 using “intercontinental ballistic 
missiles with nuclear warheads flying in orbit [for] only a part of the earth's 
circumference,”26 or using dual-use spacecraft.27  There is further 
confusion about what constitutes a “peaceful purpose.”28  
2. Other Treaties 
 The UN attempted to take demilitarization a step further by 
creating the Moon Agreement.  This Agreement attempted to further 
                                                     
22 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.S. DEP’T 
ST., https://www.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).   
23 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 
2, at art. 1.  
24 Id., at art. 4 (emphasis added).   
25 Kuplic, supra note 14, at 1144. 
26 Andrzej Jacewicz, Problems of the Militarization of Space and International 
Law, 14 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 145, 147 (1985). 
27 Chanock, supra note 16, at 701. 
28 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra 
note 2, at art. 4.  
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codify restrictions on the appropriation of outer space, specifically 
restrictions on nations claiming parts of celestial bodies, but was 
unsuccessful as no spacefaring nation ratified it.29  After the Moon 
Agreement, the UN continued attempts to further expand and clarify the 
Outer Space Treaty by creating new treaties or by amendments to the 
current treaties, but these expansions were continually denied by most of 
the spacefaring nations and faced the most resistance from the United 
States.30  The following are a few of these “expansionary treaties,” none 
of which have been ratified by the United States.   
 The Rescue Agreement expanded on Article V of the Outer Space 
Treaty by calling “for the rendering of all possible assistance to astronauts 
in the event of accident, distress or emergency landing, the prompt and 
safe return of astronauts, and the return of objects launched into outer 
space” in order “to promote international co-operation in the peaceful 
exploration and use of outer space.”31  The Space Liability Convention 
“provided a more detailed framework [for liability issues], ameliorating 
the concerns of non-space actors who feared bearing the cost of a space 
accident over its territory when it was not posing the same risk to space 
actors.”32  The Space Registration Convention “formalized who and what 
must be registered with the United Nations.”33  
 To better address the current issues involving the weaponization 
of space, the international legal framework needs to change so that it 
places limits on what is prohibited in space beyond just weapons of mass 
destruction.  This change must either be accomplished by amendment to 
the Outer Space Treaty or by the creation of a new treaty altogether.  To 
make this change, however, the United States must agree to at least show 
up to the negotiation table.     
B. Domestic Law 
 In 1958, in response to the Soviet Union’s successful launch of 
Sputnik, Congress passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act, which 
                                                     
29 Quinn, supra note 3, at 482 (“The treaty aimed too high, however, and was 
never ratified by any space actor.”). 
30 Kuplic, supra note 14, at 1157. 
31 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the 
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space art. 1, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 
7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119. 
32 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187. 
33 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.  For further examples of rejected 
amendments to the Outer Space Treaty, see Filho, supra note 1, at 366–67.   
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created NASA and specified that military space activities would be 
conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD).34  The idea of the DOD 
placing weapons in space is controversial.  While some argue that putting 
weapons in space will set a dangerous precedent,35 others argue that the 
United States needs to remain the leader in the weaponization of space so 
that it can control the limits.36   
1. The Bush Administration 
 In 2006, the Bush Administration released its overtly aggressive 
Space Policy, which took a unilateral approach to space policy, stating:  
The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes 
or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use 
of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not 
impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, 
development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for 
U.S. national interests.37  
The policy “showcased the United States’ continued departure from the 
idealistic intentions originally embodied in the Outer Space Treaty.”38  
Under this policy, the United States could put weapons in space if it 
deemed it necessary to protect the United States’ space capabilities or to 
sustain its advantage in space.   
 
                                                     
34 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426 
(1958).  
35 See Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 11, at 521 (quoting FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL 
B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 532 (2009) (“Once one state begins to assert 
unilateral authority to weaponise outer space with the implicit threat of the use of 
those weapons, other states will use that precedent to assert their own unilateral 
authority.”); see also Kuplic, supra note 14, at 1141 (“[I]f countries currently 
capable of militarizing outer space, such as the United States and Russia, pursue 
unhindered military operations in outer space, other nations will likely follow, 
thereby bringing potentially unpredictable—or even dangerous—players into the 
mix.”).  This idea of not setting a dangerous precedent deterred the United States 
from “beating” the Soviet Union into space during the Cold War.  See Mike Wall, 
Space Race: Could the U.S. Have Beaten the Soviets into Space?, SPACE.COM 
(April 8, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.space.com/11336-space-race-united-stat 
es-soviets-spaceflight-50years.html.  
36 See RUMSFELD SPACE COMMISSION, supra note 17 (showing that the new U.S. 
space policy would move the United States in the direction of fielding offensive 
and defensive space weapons). 
37 Off. of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Exec. Office of the President, National Space Policy 
of the United States of America 2 (Aug. 31, 2006).  
38 Quinn, supra note 3, at 492. 
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2. The Obama Administration 
 In 2010, the Obama Administration released its National Space 
Policy, which seemed to take a softer and less unilateral stance than the 
Bush Administration had, stating, “[t]he United States will consider 
proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, 
effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United 
States and its allies.”39  In the 2012 Department of Defense Strategy 
Report, the Obama Administration clarified its space position.  It 
elaborated that “peaceful purposes” include military activities in 
furtherance of national and homeland security purposes.40  The Strategy 
Report concluded that the DOD will “develop capabilities, plans, and 
options” for space defense measures.41    
 The Bush and Obama Administrations indicated that the United 
States does not intend to take a passive approach to its domestic space 
policy.  The Trump Administration has already signed space legislation 
demonstrating it too will follow this approach.42  To protect its assets in 
space and to ensure that it acts in accordance to international law, the 
United States must join the discussion to amend the current legal 
framework in space.   
III. ANALYSIS 
 There is a clear disconnect between the aspirations of the Outer 
Space Treaty and current realities.  The Outer Space Treaty is too outdated 
to keep up with the current technology trends in space satellites and 
weaponry.  While the Treaty continues to successfully keep nuclear 
weapons out of space, as technology advances, nuclear weapons are not 
the biggest concern in outer space anymore.  To ensure global stability, a 
clearer line must be drawn concerning the limits of space weaponry.  Many 
questions concerning the militarization and weaponization of space should 
                                                     
39 White House, National Space Policy of the United States of America 3 (June 
28, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/national_spa 
ce_policy_6-28-10.pdf.  
40 Id. (declaring that “‘peaceful purposes’ allow[ ] for space to be used for national 
and homeland security activities” and that “[t]he United States will employ a 
variety of measures to help assure the use of space for all responsible parties . . . 
[and] deter others from interference and attack . . . and, if deterrence fails, defeat 
efforts to attack them.”). 
41 Id. at 14 (stating that the President specified that the Secretary of Defense must 
“develop capabilities, plans, and options” for space defense measures). 
42 See Calla Cofield, President Trump Signs NASA Authorization Bill, SPACE.COM 
(March 21, 2017,  2:46 PM), http://www.space.com/36154-president-trump-signs 
-nasa-authorization-bill.html.  
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be discussed and answered proactively now, rather than reactively in the 
future after a crisis situation has occurred in space.  
A. The Militarization of Space Versus the Demilitarization of Space 
 The militarization and the weaponization of space are two separate 
concepts.  The militarization of space is a passive concept and merely 
entails having a military presence in space.  Space is currently militarized 
because nations have placed technology designed or operated by the 
military into space, in particular reconnaissance satellites and GPS 
systems.43  Space is already militarized to a certain extent with the current 
satellite capabilities in space, but there are not yet any weapons in orbit in 
space.44  Thus, at the onset it is best to address whether space can or should 
be demilitarized, and if not, how far the militarization of space ought to 
go.  Where along the spectrum from no militarization of space to unbridled 
militarization and weaponization of space should the line be drawn that 
divides the acceptable and allowed from the unacceptable and forbidden? 
1. Demilitarization of Space:  Have Peaceful and Military Uses of 
Spacecraft Become Too Intertwined? 
 Currently, the militarization of space has primarily been the 
passive use of space, focusing on the use of various reconnaissance and 
communications functions.45  Some argue that space has always been 
militarized because “military considerations were at the heart of the 
original efforts to enter space and have remained so to the present day.”46  
Of the over 1,300 satellites in space, it is estimated that about three-fourths 
perform various military functions.47  Much of these military functions, 
however, are being performed not by military-owned satellites, but rather 
through the use of commercial and civilian spacecraft.  The scientific 
research available in “the final frontier”48 of space is appealing not only to 
                                                     
43 See Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 11, at 499 (“The militarisation of outer space 
may therefore be described as the passive military use of outer space . . . . The 
weaponisation of outer space may be described as ‘the deployment of weapons of 
an offensive nature in outer space or on the ground with their intended target 
located in space.’”).  
44 See id. at 501 (noting that the “vulnerability of space systems to cyber attacks 
have created international fear that weaponisation of space is a real possibility”).  
45 Id. at 499. 
46 Id. at 495 (quoting MICHAEL SHEEHAN, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF 
SPACE 2 ( 2007)).  
47 Jacewicz, supra note 26, at 145 (finding that the military nature of satellites is 
“primarily in the field of reconnaissance and communications”).   
48 This phrase was made famous by Captain Kirk (that is, William Shatner) in the 
opening narration of the Star Trek television series.  See, e.g., Star Trek: The Man 
Trap (NBC television broadcast Sept. 8, 1966).  
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scientists, but also the military.  This ideal coupled with the costs of getting 
into space has caused peaceful scientific research and passive military 
activity to become tightly intertwined.   
 Getting to space is expensive,49 and once up in space, there are a 
limited number of orbital paths available.50  Thus, at the onset, it was clear 
that military-civilian cooperation in space was needed to efficiently and 
effectively explore and utilize what space has to offer.51  Civilian and 
military space missions typically share launch pads, launch vehicles, space 
platforms, and satellites.52  Because of this dual-purpose approach, 
prohibiting any military activity in effect dampens the ability to use outer 
space at all, including for “peaceful purposes” since all space exploration 
relies so heavily on military technology and intel.53  For example, a 
satellite that “in peacetime uses the global positioning system (GPS)” for 
navigation purposes, may “in wartime utilize that same capability to target 
bombs or remotely piloted vehicles.”54  
                                                     
49 See Andrew Chaikin, Is SpaceX Changing the Rocket Equation?, AIR & SPACE 
MAG. (January 2012), http://www.airspacemag.com/space/is-spacex-changing-
the-rocket-equation-132285884/?all (“[A] Falcon 9 launch costs an average of 
$57 million, which works out to less than $2,500 per pound to orbit. That’s 
significantly less than what other U.S. launch companies typically charge, and 
even the manufacturer of China’s low-cost Long March rocket (which the U.S. 
has banned importing) says it cannot beat SpaceX’s pricing.”).  
50 Micah Zenko, A Code of Conduct for Outer Space, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 
(Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/space/code-conduct-outer-space/p26556 
(“The Obama administration has accurately described outer space as increasingly 
‘congested, contested, and competitive.’”). 
51 Elizabeth Seebode Waldrop, Integration of Military and Civilian Space Assets: 
Legal and National Security Implications, 55 A.F. L. REV. 157, 161 (2004).  This 
merging of military and civilian workforces has also been seen in the 
cybersecurity realm.  See William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain: The 
Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 97 (2010); Michael S. Rogers, A 
Challenge for the Military Cyber Workforce, 1 MIL. CYBER AFF. 2 (2015).  
52 See Waldrop, supra note 51, at 163 (stating that “the sheer expense of placing 
space systems in orbit . . . [requires] a degree of technological and practical 
compatibility . . . [and] the physical limitation of available orbits and radio 
frequencies for military and civilian systems demands a detailed technological 
awareness of many attributes”); see also SMITH, supra note 5, at 8 (stating that 
the DOD “uses some civilian satellites and vice versa”).   
53 See Jacewicz, supra note 26, at 165 (arguing that “in order to achieve the 
prohibition under international law of any activities for military purposes, it is 
necessary to be able to precisely distinguish satellites”).   
54 Esquivel de Cocca, supra note 8, at 219; see also Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 
11, at 491.   
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 Stopping the current practices in space and clarifying the line 
between military and civilian uses of space will not likely happen.  The 
distinction between military and non-military uses of space is already too 
blurred to allow the separation of military uses that will be required to 
demilitarize space.55  Further, to borrow a scientific concept, an object in 
motion stays in motion.56  In other words, the world seems to be past the 
point of being able to demilitarize outer space.   
 Moreover, any attempt now to prohibit the use of dual purpose 
technologies in outer space would likely be unsuccessful because the 
legality of these has been long accepted.57  Therefore, at a minimum, 
passive military activity in space is here to stay.  The key question now 
that needs to be addressed is whether active military use of space (i.e., the 
weaponization of space) is inevitable.   
 The merging of civilian and military technologies in space not 
only makes it nearly impossible to demilitarize space, but also brings other 
legal issues into play.  Military use of civilian spacecraft and satellites 
“may turn them, as well as their supporting infrastructure, into a bona fide 
target for future opponents.”58  This increased interdependence of the 
military and civilians in space could lead to unforeseen consequences if 
war does ever arise in space, namely that (1) “civilians risk being 
characterized as unlawful combatants directly participating in hostilities 
and therefore being unprotected” under the Law of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) and (2) “military reliance on civilian space systems may turn 
those systems into legitimate targets.”59 
                                                     
55 See e.g. Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 11, at 491 (“For example, while satellite 
technology in the form of remote sensing can be used to gather meteorological 
data, it can also be used to gather intelligence in other states. Similarly, Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) or Global Position Systems (GPS) can be 
used for civilian purposes, but also to direct bombs or cruise missiles.  
Telecommunication satellites are used to transmit not only civilian 
communications but also military messages.  Remote sensing by means of satellite 
is also used in the civilian as well as military spheres.”). 
56 See NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, THE FIRST AND 
SECOND LAWS OF MOTION (1996) (quoting Sir Isaac Newton’s First Law of 
Motion). 
57 Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 11, at 497–98.   
58 Waldrop, supra note 51, at 157 (quoting Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., U.S. Air Force, 
Technology: Recomplicating Moral Life for the Nation's Defenders, 29 
PARAMETERS 24, 30 (1999). 
59 Id. at 230.  For more information on this issue, see Walter D. Reed, Military 
Use of the Space Shuttle, 13 AKRON L. REV. 665 (1980); Sean C. Temple, 
Developing Tomorrow's Space War Fighter: The Argument for Contracting Out 
Satellite Operations, 29 AIR & SPACE POWER J. 83 (2015).  
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2. How Far Should the Militarization of Space Progress? 
 Because it is nearly impossible to demilitarize space at this point, 
the next logical step is to determine how far the militarization of space 
should go in order to determine the best legal framework to address these 
limits.  Should the global community attempt to keep things from 
progressing further than they already have, or should it embrace weaponry 
in space and work to set limits on the kinds of weapons allowed in space?  
Either option requires further clarification of the law in space.  The optimal 
level of weaponization must protect the free exploration of space for 
scientific and research purposes.  The world cannot afford to crowd out 
peaceful space exploration with the over-weaponization of space.  Below 
are some of the arguments for and against weaponizing space and making 
space a battleground.  Note, however, this section focuses primarily on the 
arguments for and against the weaponization of space from the United 
States’ perspective.   
 For the United States, placing weaponry in space may allow it to 
maintain its “control” of space and ensure that it keeps its advantage in the 
space race.60  If the weaponization of space is inevitable, then it is in the 
United States’ best interest to lead the pack and be the one to set the 
precedent on what is acceptable and what is not.61  Many proponents of 
weaponizing space argue that “the United States needs to be at the 
forefront of space weaponization and cannot afford to let its military power 
slip away by not being prepared for the future of warfare.”62  While this 
will have huge costs associated with it at the onset, having to play catch-
up later will be much more costly.  These concerns were seen in the 2001 
Rumsfeld Space Commission, which claimed that the United States may 
be vulnerable to a “Space Pearl Harbor.”63  
 Furthermore, the United States continues to remain vulnerable as 
space grows in importance for national security, the economy, and 
technological advances.  It is imperative that the United States’ access to 
space continue unobstructed, and many argue that it must put weapons in 
                                                     
60 See Chanock, supra note 16, at 692 (“Proponents of space weaponization see 
this development as a natural progression and imperative for the United States to 
maintain its military dominance.”); Filho, supra note 1, at 359 (the DOD 
maintains that United States control in space will “probably require the 
development of space-based weapons”). 
61 See Quinn, supra note 3, at 495 (“Given the inevitability of the weaponization 
of space, it behooves every nation to weaponize as soon as possible to stay ahead 
of the curve.”) (citations omitted).  
62 Chanock, supra note 16, at 699. 
63 Id.  
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space in order to ensure this in the current age.64  Space weaponry will not 
only protect the United States’ assets both on Earth and in space, but will 
also deter further conflict with other nations.65   
 On the other hand, the United States needs to balance its desire to 
maintain its advantage in space with being careful not to set a dangerous 
precedent regarding the weaponization of space.66  Placing weapons in 
space will almost certainly escalate the space arms race.67  As Lyall and 
Larsen observed:  “Once one state begins to assert unilateral authority to 
weaponize outer space with the implicit threat of the use of those weapons, 
other states will use that precedent to assert their own unilateral 
authority.”68  Nations which currently have no space capabilities would 
race to join those spacefaring nations “thereby bringing potentially 
unpredictable — or even dangerous — players into the mix.”69  Weapons 
in space “create distrust and suspicion among states in a world that is 
increasingly in need of global security and cooperation.”70  This compels 
many to argue that the new legal framework that is needed must prohibit 
any type of weapon in space.71   
 Furthermore, as mentioned above, the United States has become 
quite dependent on its space-based technology for both military use and 
daily civilian life.  The satellites that are so crucial to the United States 
may become more vulnerable “by a proliferation of ASAT weapons in 
outer space.”72  While the United States is currently dominant in space, the 
production of ASAT weapons is relatively simple and affordable.  Thus, 
superiority in space does not necessarily mean that the nation is 
                                                     
64 See Filho, supra note 1, at 361 (“To maintain our current advantage in space 
even as more users develop capabilities and access, we must focus sufficient 
intelligence efforts on monitoring foreign use of space-based assets as well as 
developing the capabilities required to protect our systems and prevent hostile use 
of space by an adversary.”) (emphasis added).  
65 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitics and Astropolitik: Strategy and Space 
Deployment, in HARNESSING THE HEAVENS: NATIONAL DEFENSE THROUGH 
SPACE 111 (Paul G. Gillespie & Grant T. Weller eds., 2008).  
66 See Wall, supra note 35.   
67 Jinyuan Su, Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes: Non-Militarization, 
Non-Aggression and Prevention of Weaponization, 36 J. SPACE L. 253, 271 
(2010).  
68 Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 11, at 521 (quoting  LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 
35, at 532). 
69 Kuplic, supra note 14, at 1142. 
70 Id. at 1162.   
71 See Jacewicz, supra note 26, at 166 (“[T]he primary aim which ought to be 
striven for is the legal prohibition of placing any type of weapons in outer space.”).  
72 Kuplic, supra note 14, at 1141.   
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invulnerable to “an attack that could cripple military operations or even 
the daily life of civilian society.”73   
 A final concern with the weaponization of space, which came to 
light with the recent Chinese ASAT weapons testing, is the amount of 
space debris that may be produced from the destruction of spacecraft, 
satellites, and weapons.  Space debris is a significant threat to any structure 
in space.  The debris from an ASAT weapon attack could easily damage 
many other unintended space targets.   
 The United States has an advantage in space, which places it in 
the best position to influence the next international legal regime for space 
activity.  The current framework under the Outer Space Treaty no longer 
adequately regulates space activity, particularly military activity in 
space.74  A new framework must be developed and agreed upon that will 
modernize and clarify the limits on weapons in space, and the United 
States likely must lead the charge for any change to be successful.     
B. The Future of International Space Law  
 The current state of outer space law warrants revitalization.  The 
Outer Space Treaty, specifically Article IV, has become largely ineffective 
and irrelevant.  “[A]rticle IV of the Outer Space Treaty cannot adequately 
deal with the current issues relating to the military use of outer space,”75 
but many of the spacefaring nations, especially the United States, refuse 
to sign on to additional space treaties.  A new legal framework for space 
must be established by amending the Outer Space Treaty at a minimum or 
alternatively by forming a new treaty altogether.76 The new legal 
framework, whether it allows weapons in space or not, must protect the 
freedom and ability for all to explore and research in space.  This will 
require strict legal security with “the prevalence of objective clear norms 
which guarantee the domain of the law over the individual will.”77   
 When the Outer Space Treaty was adopted in 1967, nuclear 
weapons were the only real threat to the outer space community.78  Since 
then, there have been huge technological advances, and the weapons 
                                                     
73 Id. at 1161.   
74 Filho, supra note 1, at 366. 
75 Ferreira-Snyman, supra note 11, at 520. 
76 See Chanock, supra note 16, at 702 (“The treaty has too many holes and not 
enough teeth to police a space arms race among the world superpowers. As a 
result, it is vital that the international community amend the treaty or create an 
entirely new one that is properly constructed to handle the emergence of space 
weapons in a realistic and efficient manner.”). 
77 Filho, supra note 1, at 366. 
78 Kuplic, supra note 14, at 1137.   
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discussed earlier “pose equally significant threats to global security.”79  In 
addition, the Outer Space Treaty “contains textual ambiguities that do not 
easily lend themselves to one cohesive interpretation.”80  
 The first option, which is more realistic, to address these issues 
and ambiguities is to amend the Outer Space Treaty.  Like other U.N. 
treaties, the Outer Space Treaty allows for amendment and for member 
withdrawal.81  Article XV permits countries to propose amendments.82  For 
an amendment to enter into force, it must be accepted by a majority of 
parties, but it will only be binding on those countries that explicitly 
approve the amendment.83  Article XVI authorizes a country to withdrawal 
from the Treaty.84  If a country chooses to withdraw, it will take effect a 
year after that country has submitted a written notification of its intentions 
to the depositary states–the United States, Russia, and the United 
Kingdom.  This could be accomplished in part by amending the current 
language of “other peaceful purposes” to expressly say “non-aggressive 
purposes.”  An ongoing debate concerning the definition of “peaceful 
purposes” has ensued between the spacefaring nations and the non-space 
nations, especially concerning whether it means “non-military” or “non-
aggressive.”85   
 To believe that “peaceful purposes” could mean “non-military” in 
today’s world is naïve.  As discussed above, space has already been 
militarized to a certain extent.  The fact that so much of space technology 
is dual-use means that prohibiting any military use at this point is nearly 
impossible.86  Moreover, no current spacefaring nation would agree to this 
definition because its civilian and military space activity is so 
interdependent.87  In contrast, defining “peaceful purposes” as “non-
aggressive” use of outer space “places a limitation on the behavioral, 
rather than technological, aspect of State actions in outer space.”88  Under 
this definition, states would be able to continue passive military action in 
space and would even be able to place weapons in space as a deterrence 
                                                     
79 Id.  
80 Id.   
81 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 16, Jan. 
27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. 
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id.   
85 Jacewicz, supra note 26, at 158.   
86 Su, supra note 67, at 259. 
87 Id. at 272.  
88 Id. at 261. 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 377 
statement, but could not use those weapons or threaten to use force from 
outer space.89  States would also be allowed to place weapons in space as 
a defensive maneuver and use them for self-defense purposes.   
 Under international law, a nation may use force when authorized 
by the UN Security Council, in accordance with Article 42 of the UN 
Charter, and in self-defense, in accordance with Article 51 and with 
customary international law.90  Both of these uses of force would still be 
available to nations in space if the Outer Space Treaty were amended to 
say “non-aggressive,” rather than “peaceful purposes.”  Such an 
amendment would allow nations to continue to develop space weaponry 
and even put that weaponry in orbit, but it would keep space from 
becoming an active battlefield, a necessity for allowing the continued free 
research and exploration of space.  Note, however, that there would still 
be a prohibition on nuclear weapons in space and a prohibition on 
colonizing or placing bases on the moon or other celestial bodies.   
 A second and more optimal option would be to start over and 
create a whole new treaty.  To ensure that space will remain a final frontier 
open to all nations, such a new treaty would likely need to lay out a scheme 
for a “non-aggressive” use of space by creating “rules related to the 
development and deployment of weapons capable of damage, destruction, 
or interference.”91  It would also be beneficial to establish an international 
body designated to monitor the activities and programs of nations 
deployed in space.  To start over on the legal framework is a promising 
option, but the first option of amending the current Treaty is likely more 
feasible since it is a more incremental change.  Thus, an amendment 
should be the first focus.   
 The United States has already begun to implement their own 
version of this with its Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness 
Program.92  This program includes a four-satellite mission run by the 
United States Air Force that began in 2014.  The mission of the program 
is “to scour Earth's orbit for weaponized satellites capable of doing harm 
to satellites already in orbit” and to determine if a missile is successfully 
                                                     
89 Id; see also Kuplic, supra note 14, at 1133–34 (comparing laws governing the 
high seas, Antarctica, and airspace with a potential legal framework for outer 
space). 
90 In order to use force in self-defense, it must be necessary and proportional.  
There may be further issues with pre-emptive self-defense in space as is already 
an issue on Earth now.   
91 Kuplic, supra note 14, at 1158. 
92 Lee Billings, War in Space May Be Closer than Ever, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Aug. 
10, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-clos 
er-than-ever.  
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intercepted in space.93  Thus, the technology is available to establish a 
monitoring system to ensure compliance with a new treaty.  This system 
could provide greater stability and help convince nations to sign onto a 
new treaty in the first place.  But, whether or not the United States would 
be willing to share this monitoring system is a big question.   
B. The Feasibility of Progress  
 For either of the two options above to be effective, they must have 
(a) “wide international acceptance,” (b) “incentives for state and private 
actors to use outer space,” and (c) “flexibility to adapt to changes in the 
international community.”94  Unfortunately, many prior attempts to amend 
the Outer Space Treaty or form new treaties have been unsuccessful in 
obtaining such widespread international acceptance.95  And, the United 
States has often been the most resistant when discussing these potential 
changes.  The United States typically has not agreed to space amendments 
or treaties because it believes its sovereignty will be deteriorated by such 
agreements.96  Also troubling for any attempt to change the current legal 
framework in space is the fact that “the United States has a track record of 
resisting agreements specifically designed to prevent an arms race in outer 
space.”97   
 It seems highly unlikely that the United States would sign onto 
anything that would restrict its ability to develop and test new space 
weaponry.  But, the option to amend the Outer Space Treaty does not 
change much concerning space activity, rather it merely clarifies and 
codifies the current understanding of the spacefaring nations about the 
Outer Space Treaty.  As more space incidents occur similar to the ones 
described in Part I and new space weapon technologies begin to be 
developed,98 the United States may become more willing to begin 
discussions of reform.   
                                                     
93 Rich Smith, U.S. Air Force Moves To Prevent Militarization of Space, MOTLEY 
FOOL (Aug. 27, 2016, 12:13 PM), http://www.fool.com/investing/2016/08/27/us-
air-force-moves-to-prevent-militarization-of-sp.aspx.  
94 Quinn, supra note 3, at 497.   
95 See supra Part II.2 concerning other attempts at international space treaties that 
failed to gain sufficient support from spacefaring nations.   
96 Kuplic, supra note 14, at 1160. 
97 Id.  
98 Some space weaponry currently being developed include kinetic energy ASAT 
capabilities; co-orbital ASAT capabilities, which “use a missile armed with 
explosives” to detonate when in close proximity to a target; directed energy 
capabilities, such as dazzlers, lasers, or high-powered microwave frequencies; 
“soft-kill” weapons, which disable rather than destroy; electromagnetic 
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 A new treaty that includes a monitoring provision would be in the 
United States’ best interest because it would provide stability in space 
while protecting American spacecraft and satellites.  Yet, the United States 
may not trust the UN with this monitoring power and may feel more secure 
with its own current monitoring program.  The United States has lost 
considerable faith in the UN concerning space activity, particularly after 
the UN failed to respond to a formal complaint filed by the United States 
regarding the Chinese ASAT weapon test but having the UN take no action 
in response.99   
 The United States remains significantly ahead of every other 
nation in the space race and the space arms race.  It does not appear that 
the United States will take any new legal framework seriously until this 
advantage is threatened.  Unfortunately, this is a dangerous approach to 
take.  It might be wiser to lead the discussions regarding space law reform 
now, rather than to act after falling behind in the space race.   
CONCLUSION 
 Space wars are no longer science fiction.  Although it hasn’t 
occurred yet, an arms battle in space may be imminent and has certainly 
become a genuine issue that the international community must come to 
terms with and address with a new legal framework in the near future.  The 
current Outer Space Treaty no longer has any weight behind it and is 
continually losing clout as new space technology is being developed.  The 
Treaty is further becoming obsolete as military, civilian, and commercial 
uses of spacecraft have merged and become interdependent.  A new space 
law framework must be developed, either by amending the Outer Space 
Treaty or by creating a new space law treaty, and adopted by the broader 
international community to address these issues before space becomes a 
battlefield with no rules.  Space is an indispensable resource for all nations 
to utilize.  This new space law framework must find a balance between the 
interests in national security and the interests in keeping space available 
for exploration and research.100  If outer space becomes a constant 
battlefield, nations will focus their efforts on developing capabilities and 
lose sight of scientific ones.  Moreover, few will feel safe to invest in space 
technology that may be easily destroyed, and fewer still will feel safe to 
explore the vast unknowns of the final frontier.    
                                                     
weaponry, such as a nuclear bomb; and space bombers.  See, e.g., Chanock, supra 
note 16, at 694; Kuplic, supra note 14, at 1137–39. 
99 See Quinn, supra note 3, at 476 (“The United States submitted a formal 
complaint; the United Nations took no action in response.”). 
100 See id. at 489 (“In place of granting space to all mankind, the treaty restricted 
space from all mankind and stunted space exploration.”).  
